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“It is a remarkable fact that
writing and reading as well as
talking and writing about fiction
proceed so smoothly”
[Jacquette, 2003, 115].
1 Philosophical theories of fiction
Jacquette is right: it is remarkable how, as a general rule, we interact so eas-
ily with fiction, not only in reading and writing and talking about it, but also
viewing it. (In fact, if one isn’t a philosopher, one may never have any trouble
whatsoever interacting with fiction—this sort of worry is the sort that often only
philosophers have!). While non-existent objects pose special problems for com-
positional semantics, as [Frege, 2001] demonstrates, we routinely make state-
ments about non-existent objects such as Santa Claus, Sherlock Holmes, and
Pegasus—indeed, reading philosophical work on non-existent or fictional objects
in the last half a century, one gets the impression that Santa Claus, Sherlock
Holmes, and Pegasus are the only fictional objects out there. Furthermore, the
statements we make about these fictional objects are understandable even if it
is not immediately clear whether or how they are truth-evaluable. Few people
are willing to admit that we cannot make true and false predications about
non-existent objects, and fewer still to admit that such predications are mean-
ingless. This gives rise to a central desideratum for a philosophical account of
fiction (or fictional discourse, or fictional objects): That it make sense of this
intuition that predications about fictional objects are meaningful, and, at least
in some cases, truth-evaluable or truth-apt. (Note that truth-aptness requires
meaningfulness, but not necessarily the other way around.)
Here we can see motivation for a number of philosophical questions that are
standardly asked about fiction:
• Metaphysics: What are non-existent objects, such as Santa Claus, Sher-
lock Holmes, Pegasus?
• Epistemology: How do we know things about them?
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• Language: How do we say meaningful (and true!) things about them?
And not only can we ask these things about fictional objects, but about fic-
tional stories themselves more generally, moving beyond questions of language
to questions of metaphysics and epistemology—what are fictional stories, and
how can we know things about them?
But after we’ve asked these questions, and tried to answer them, it’s im-
portant to realise that questions of fiction are not merely questions about non-
existent objects. There is an epistemic dimension to fictional objects—the fact
that we know that fictional objects are fictional—that is an important way of
distinguishing fictional objects from (merely) non-existent ones, many of which
may be believed to exist. [Crane, 2013] labels these two different classes of non-
existent objects as ‘fiction(al) objects’ (which do not exist and are known not to
exist) and ‘error objects’ (which do not exist but may be believed to exist). Thus
it is an epistemic dimension that distinguishes fictional objects from error ob-
jects, not a metaphysical or ontological one. We may believe that error objects
exist, but we are mistaken, or in error, in doing so. As soon as we learn that an
object is an error object, it ceases to become one and instead becomes a fictional
object. Thus, ether, or the planet Vulcan, are error objects only in so far as
we do not know (or believe) that they are error objects. This epistemological
distinction means that we should differentiate philosophical accounts of fiction
from philosophical accounts of non-existent objects more generally: there must
be more to accounts of fiction than simply an explanation of non-existence.
Furthermore, making (meaningful, truth-evaluable) predications about non-
existent objects is not the only philosophical way that we interact with fiction,
and the reason we are interested in asking the epistemological and metaphys-
ical questions too is not merely for their own sake but because of how the
answers to those questions have an impact on more than just talk about non-
existent objects. Thus any adequate account of fiction and fictional objects
will involve not only theories of language and meaning, but also of ontology
and epistemology [D’Alessandro, 2016, 53]). There are numerous puzzles spe-
cific to fictional contexts that we can then ask our metaphysical, epistemolog-
ical, and linguistic theories to say something about. For instance, the meta-
physics of fictional objects should be able to explain the paradox of fictional
emotion [Radford, 1975, Walton, 1978], wherein we seem to feel genuine emo-
tions to things that we know do not exist. We can also, for example, ask that
theories accounting for the meaningfulness of discourse about fictional objects
should also say something about the meaningfulness of fictional (constructed)
languages ([Uckelman and Chan, 2016]), or wonder how it is that fictional char-
acters maintain their identity across different media [Sandgren, 2016].
But we should desire more from our philosophical theories of fiction than
simply an account of the ontology and epistemology of fiction objects, coupled
with a theory of meaning that allows us to make meaningful or perhaps even
truth-evaluable claims about these objects, because these accounts alone do not
shed light onto one of the most fundamental features of fiction, which is that
it is constructed. It is in consideration of this important feature that we, in
this paper, consider a fictional phenomenon which has, to date, been largely
ignored in philosophical contexts: Fanfiction.1 The study of fanfiction from a
1Scholarly discussions of fanfic are generally found in media and cultural studies, and
to a lesser extent in literature and narrative studies, cf., e.g., [Busse and Hellekson, 2006,
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philosophical point of view raises a number of questions: What is fanfiction?
What distinguishes it from ordinary fiction? How can we make sense of what is
going on when people create and interact with fanfiction?
Beyond addressing some of these questions raised above in the current paper,
we want to motivate the more general claim that fanfiction—and indeed all of
fandom—is something that philosophers should be interested in analysing them.
In preparing this paper, we were quite struck by the fact that fanfiction as a
topic for academic consideration first showed up among sociologists (especially
in media and cultural studies) around about 2000, where people focused on
fanfiction as a social phenomenon. About a decade later is when literature
scholars took up the idea of analysing fanfics using the same tools of analysis of
so-called “literary texts” (as if fanfic is not itself literary!). By my calculations,
this makes 2020 the right time for philosophers to come onto the scene and pick
up the interesting—and distinctive—philosophical questions that fanfiction and
fandom provide!
In the scope of the present paper we cannot give a comprehensive philo-
sophical account of fanfic. Instead, we aim to provide a starting point for fur-
ther discussions, namely, looking at two competing accounts of fanfiction—the
derivative or dependent account and the constitutive account—and argue that
these competing views parallel two competing ways in which a possible worlds
account of fiction can be fleshed out, namely, Lewis’s modal realist account and
Kripke’s stipulative view. The existence of these parallels is not merely inter-
esting in its own right, but we will argue further that its existence provides
us with a test of adequacy for the possible worlds accounts: It is worthless to
provide a philosophical account of the theoretical foundations of fiction if such
an account doesn’t coordinate with the actual practice and production of fic-
tion. A philosophical theory of fiction which mischaracterizes or fails to explain
aspects of the practice of fiction—including the production and consumption of
fanfiction—cannot be an adequate theory.
We begin in section 2 by laying out the basic definitions of concepts impor-
tant for understanding fanfic, in particular the notions of canon and authority
that must be explicated in order to even define fanfiction, and highlighting philo-
sophically relevant aspects. We are particularly interested in whether fanfictions
are best viewed as derivative of or dependent on their ‘parent’ fictions or as (at
least partially) constitutive of those fictions. In section 3, we consider two ver-
sions of the possible worlds approach to fiction, namely those of [Lewis, 1978]
and [Kripke, 1980], and show to what extent these theories make sense of the
notions of canon and authority, and to what extent they accord with actual
practices of fanfiction, taking into account both producers and consumers. In
particular we argue that if one takes a dependent view of fanfiction, one should
be inclined to adopt a Lewisian account, while proponents of a constitutive ac-
count are pushed towards a Kripkean account. Ultimately, however, neither of
these accounts is entirely satisfactory, and we conclude in section 4 by outlining
ways in which these drawbacks can potentially be ameliorated and ways we hope
to see the present work built upon.
Thomas, 2011, Jamison, 2013]. The only specifically philosophical treatment we have found—
[Cook, 2013]—addresses the topic obliquely. Even the numerous books connected to literary
fiction in the very prolific Popular Culture and Philosophy Series contain almost no discussion
of the phenomenon.
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2 What is fanfiction?
Before we can say anything about what philosophical theories of fiction have to
say about fanfic, we need to first say what we mean by this term. As Thomas
defines it,
The term fanfiction (sometimes abbreviated as fanfic) refers to sto-
ries produced by fans based on plot lines and characters from either
a single source text or else a ‘canon’ of works; these fan-created nar-
ratives often take the pre-existing storyworld in a new, sometimes
bizarre, direction ([Thomas, 2011, 1]; cf. [Black, 2007, 385]).
That is, fanfiction is both fiction—it covers “texts available in the Internet which
cannot be considered literature proper, but which incorporation in literary anal-
ysis would expand the boundaries of traditional literature” [Viires, 2005, 162]—
and it is fan-driven, comprised of “texts created as a so-called pseudo-sequel
to a book, comic book, anime, television series or a movie, which is. . . created
by. . . fans” [Viires, 2005, 162–163]; both of these aspects are essential. Fanfic-
tion is “a subgenre of a larger, older genre of literature that is generally called
‘derivative’ or ‘appropriative”’ [Derecho, 2006, 63], and in recent years it has
increasingly become an online, Internet-based phenomenon.2 Fanfic is a part
of a broader fan-based phenomenon generally referred to as “fandom”, which
encompasses not only fanfic but also cosplay, game modding, vidding (“an art
in which clips from television shows and movies are set to music to make an
argument or tell a story”, [Coppa, 2009, 108], and other activities.
We cannot do justice to the breadth of this huge swathe of diverse phe-
nomenon in a single article, and do not attempt to. For the purposes of this
article, we are interested in fanfic produced in connection with 20th and 21st
century works, primarily (but not exclusively) written fanfic in the science fic-
tion and fantasy genre. It is natural to take this circumscribed approach to
fanfiction given that the 1920s and 1930s represent a distinct turning point in
the history of fanfic [Thomas, 2011, 1]; [Viires, 2005, 163–164], when a prolifera-
tion of fanzines came into existence. It follows that we exclude from the present
analysis visual fanfic, e.g., comic-books and films; the interesting connections
between Live-Action Role-Playing (LARP) stories and fanfic; and considera-
tions of what historical examples of fiction can and cannot count as “fanfic”
(See [Derecho, 2006] and [Mac Cana, 1980] for examples of historical “fanfic-
tion”.3)—not because these are not fascinating and complicated questions in
their own right, but only because when beginning an investigation it makes
sense to start with a small and well-defined phenomenon rather than embracing
everything. If we can present an understanding of a narrow slice of fanfic, then
we will be in a position to extend the analysis to these further topics.
A central concept required to understand the creation of fanfic and how its
authors and consumers interact with it is the concept of canon, which includes
“the events presented in the media source that provide the universe, setting,
and characters” [Busse and Hellekson, 2006, 9] and which “may encompass film
2For a good history of the move of fandom from print to online media, see the introduction
of [Busse and Hellekson, 2006].
3For instance, it has been suggested that Milton’s Paradise Lost is merely “Bible fanfic-
tion”; and one philosopher from Stirling tickled my fancy greatly by suggesting that perhaps
all of Aristotelian commentary could be understood as fanfiction!
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adaptations of a text, interviews with the author or cast, and even merchandising
and marketing” [Thomas, 2011, 8]. Without a canon, there can be no fanfic,
for without some antecedently created story, there is nothing for fans to become
fans of, and thus nothing to make what they write fanfiction as opposed to
just ordinary fiction. Authors of fanfic are motivated by a desire to return “to
familiar storyworlds and characters time after time” and to have “both ‘more
of’ and ‘more from’ the fictional worlds they endlessly revisit” [Thomas, 2011,
7]. By starting from an already existing story, characters, or world, authors
of fanfic produce what has been called “transformative works”, which “take
existing artifacts and add to or alter them to create a new message or meaning”
[Busse, 2009, 104]. This transformative aspect is closely connected to issues of
canon, for canon puts constraints on how much the original material can be
transformed and still be “the same” material, in some suitable sense.
The existence of canon is “particularly important for the creators of fan
texts because they are judged on how well they stick to or depart from canon”
[Busse and Hellekson, 2006, 10]; cf. [Pearson, 2003, 3], even though “fans have
always disregarded aspects of the books that are unequivocally canonical if they
interfere with the stories fans want to create” [Tosenberger, 2008, 201]. This
disregard illustrates one of the complications in giving an adequate account of
what can count as canon: Canon itself is dependent on a notion of authority,
in so far as there must be someone (or some ones) who can arbitrate what is
and what is not canon, but this authority doesn’t always lie in the original
author or creator. Not only can aspects of the original story can be ignored
or dispensed with (as Tosenberger notes), the author can herself accept an
outside source as an authority on some aspect of her story. We highlight two
examples of this happening. The first is J.K. Rowling’s assenting to a specific
fanfic interpretation of Professor Dumbledore’s sexual orientation. After this
“bombshell”, “journalists and fans debated the ‘canonicity’ of Dumbledore’s
homosexuality. Journalist Jeffrey Weiss claimed, ‘If you didn’t put it in the
books, please don’t tell us now,’ a view echoed by some fans” [Tosenberger, 2008,
201]. Another example is [Peterson, 2015] construction of the Dothraki language
for use not only in the “Game of Thrones” TV series but also in G.R.R. Martin’s
Song of Fire and Ice books, an example we discuss further below.
The complicated relationship between author, canon, and authority is mani-
fested in another concept closely related to canon, namely that of fanon. Fanon
can be characterised in a number of different ways, as “the events created by the
fan community in a particular fandom and repeated pervasively throughout the
fantext” [Busse and Hellekson, 2006, 9], “the process whereby over time certain
plot or character elements become established within the fan community—even
when those elements never appeared in the source text, or radically depart from
it” [Thomas, 2011, 8–9], or “the noncanonical knowledge about a source text,
[which] is the sum of the community’s shared interpretive acts” [Kaplan, 2006,
136]. On such an account, fanon is an essentially constructive phenomenon, the
result of a performative act. The line between canon and fanon is, unsurpris-
ingly, a blurry one, and some have argued that it is possible for elements of fanon
to cross the line into canon. (One proposed example is Colin Firth’s wet shirt
scene in the 1995 BBC production of “Pride and Prejudice” [Thomas, 2011, 8],
which turns up in many post-1995 adaptations of the story.)
It is important, though, that not every story that is consistent with the
original story is eligible to become canon. How fanfic becomes canon is in large
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part a social process—whereby sufficient agreement that the story is canon is
engendered—but even without considering the social dimension to the determi-
nation of what can become canon, it is still possible to say that certain fanfics
are simply not eligible. Looking at how people interact with fanfic show that
the producers of it do not have free choice (“fans debate and even police el-
ements of the canon, for example by complaining that a story is OOC (Out
of Character)” [Thomas, 2011, 8]). [Cook, 2013] offers five observations on the
canon/non-canon divide [272–273] which help illustrate the constraints on what
can and cannot be canon:
1. some noncanonical works are interpretationally relevant;4
2. the canon versus noncanon distinction is sensitive to medium;5
3. canonicity practices are, at least partially, political and commercial ;6
4. canonicity practices are dynamic and negotiable: a work is not eternally
canonical;7
5. canonicity practices are participatory.8
The participatory aspects of canonicity practices are just the flip side of the
fact that fanfic is transformative of its parent canon, a fact which is perhaps the
defining feature of fanfic, distinguishing it from other types of fiction or genres
of literature.
But to say that fanfic is “transformative” is not to say anything about what
type of transformation is involved: What are we transforming? And how are
we transforming it? There is no consensus on these questions.
One way to transform a work is by taking what already exists and changing
it. Such a view makes fanfic essentially derivative in nature, “a genre fundamen-
tally based on artistic appropriation” and “a form of cultural production that
is essentially derivative” [de Kosnick, 2009, 120, emphasis added]. When one is
writing fanfic, one is not generating something new or novel, in some relevant
(though rarely specified) sense. Unfortunately, calling fanfic ‘derivative’ brings
in unnecessarily pejorative overtones. We would like to reject ‘derivative’ as a
useful label due to its negative connotations, and instead offer ‘dependent’ as
an alternative way to describe the view that fanfic essentially depends on the
canon both for its existence tout court and for its existence as fanfic.
Another way to transform a work is to add to it, to participate in the build-
ing of the world in which it is considered to exist. We can view this type of
transformation as constructive or constitutive and contrast it with the view of
fanfic as derivative. The constructive aspects of fanfic are often noted: “fan
academics have begun to think of the entirety of fan fiction in a given fannish
4That is, noncanonical works can help us understand what is going on in the canon—such
an account helps make clear how it is we could understand commentaries on the Aristotelian
canon as a type of fanfiction!
5For instance, what counts as Game of Thrones canon may differ depending on whether
you’re discussing the books or the TV series.
6Large corporations have a vested interest in policing what counts as canonical in, e.g., the
Star Wars universe.
7For instance, the rebranding of the Star Wars Expanded Universe as Star Wars Legends
and made non-canonical in 2014 [Anonymous, 2014].
8Without people agreeing that something is canon, there is no canon.
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universe as a work in progress. This fantext, the entirety of stories and critical
commentary written in a fandom (or even in a pairing or genre), offers an ever-
growing, ever-expanding version of the characters” [Busse and Hellekson, 2006,
7], and forces us to view texts not as “static, isolated objects” but as “story-
worlds [that] are generated and experienced within specific social and cultural
environments that are subject to constant change” [Thomas, 2011, 6]. Some
even consider this ‘work-in-progress’ aspect of fanfiction to be central to it
[Busse and Hellekson, 2006, 7], [Thomas, 2011, 9].
These two ways of viewing fanfic—as being essentially dependent on or es-
sentially constitutive of the parent fiction—parallel two ways in which one of the
standard philosophical accounts of fictional discourse can be cashed out. This
we turn to in the next section.
3 Possible worlds accounts of fiction
Lewis offers a modal account of fiction, developed as an alternative to Meinon-
gian approaches such as those found in [Parsons, 1974, Parsons, 1975], which
explains how we can make true and meaningful predications about fictional
objects via the notion of possible worlds. Lewis’s primary motivation is ac-
counting for predications about fictional objects for whom “there is a perfectly
good sense in which [they are] a real-life person of flesh and blood” [Lewis, 1978,
37]), and thus he is happy to exclude from consideration stories “about the ex-
ploits of super-heroes from other planets, hobbits, fires and storms, vaporous
intelligences, and other non-persons” [Lewis, 1978, 37]. There is, however, on
the face of it, no intrinsic reason why his account of fiction will not work for
these more fantastic constructs (however, if there is something about it which
excludes it from being able to analyse hobbits, superheroes, and vaporous intel-
ligences, then we have evidence that this account cannot give an account of a
large proportion of contemporary fanfiction, simply because it cannot account
for fantasy fiction).
Lewis’s proposal is to “not take our descriptions of fictional characters at
face value, but instead let us regard them as abbreviations for longer sentences
beginning with an operator ‘In such-and-such fiction. . . ’ ” [Lewis, 1978, 37], a
view which is echoed by Kripke when he says that “a work of fiction, gener-
ally speaking of course, is a pretense that what is happening in the story is
really going on” [Kripke, 2011, 58]. One task, then, of philosophy of fiction,
is to give truth conditions for sentences formed with this intensional operator
[Lewis, 1978, 37]; [Byrne, 1993, 24], and Lewis’s theory does so in terms of pos-
sible worlds. He first presents one analysis which he finds problematic, and
revises it into this second analysis:
A sentence of the form “In the fiction f , ϕ” is non-vacuously true iff,
whenever w is one of the collective belief worlds of the community
of origin of f , then some world where f is told as known fact and
ϕ is true differs less from world w, on balance, than does any world
where f is told as known fact and ϕ is not true. It is vacuously
true iff there are no possible worlds where f is told as known fact
[Lewis, 1978, 45].
The problem of impossible fictions is addressed briefly at the end of the article
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[Lewis, 1978, 45]). There are two ways in which the vacuous case might occur;
the first is when there simply happens to be no world where f is told as known
fact. The second is when f contains a contradiction, and thus cannot be rep-
resented by a possible world. The second way is of course the more interesting
one, but Lewis only gestures at possible solutions. Interestingly, one of these
routes involves something like making sense of competing fanfics: “I suppose
that we might proceed in two steps to say what is true in a venially impossible
fiction such as the Holmes stories. First, go from the original impossible fiction
to the several possible revised versions that stay closest to the original. Then
say that what is true in the original is what is true according to our analy-
ses of non-vacuous truth in fiction, all of these revised versions” [Lewis, 1978,
46]. In later work, he proposed that fictional truth instead be identified with
non-vacuous in at least one of the revised versions [Byrne, 1993, 26].
Different flavors of possible-worlds approaches to fiction are obtained by in-
corporating different theories of possible worlds, and we consider two. Lewis’s
own account of the nature of possible worlds lies at one extreme of the sliding
scale between realist and anti-realist approaches. He believes that “there are
possible worlds other than the one we happen to inhabit” which are “entities
in their own right” [Lewis, 1973, 182–183]. These entities cannot be reduced to
anything else, and they are of a kind with our own actual world [Lewis, 1973,
184]. Because these possible worlds are entities in their own right, there are
truths in them that go beyond what is explicitly stated in the fictional tales.
Thus, Lewis’s theory is, in the terminology of [D’Alessandro, 2016], an implici-
tist account of fiction, on which “there are some works and some propositions
which are not expressed by any explicit statements in those works, such that
the propositions in question are nevertheless true in the corresponding fiction”
[D’Alessandro, 2016, 53]. These worlds also exist independently of us or any of
our activities, and are neither determined nor controlled by our activities.
Thus, Jacquette is mistaken when he says that “We can wave a wand and
stipulate that there are such worlds” [Jacquette, 2003, 112] on a Lewisian ac-
count. A stipulative approach to possible worlds is, however, precisely what
we are offered with Kripke’s views of possible worlds, in which “(1) Generally,
things aren’t ‘found out’ about a counterfactual situation; they are stipulated;
(2) possible worlds need not be given purely qualitatively, as if we were looking
at them through a telescope” [Kripke, 1980, 49–50]. (This sort of stipulative
account is called “Fictional Vichianism” by [Voltolini, 2011].) On such a view,
we do not “discover” things about possible worlds, through a telescope or other-
wise; rather, we are able to decide what occurs in a possible world, and it is our
decision that causes there to be a possible world of a particular kind. (Such an
account of possible worlds dispenses with the first way in which vacuous truth
can arise on Lewis’s account, for we are always at liberty to stipulate that there
is in fact such a world where f is told as known fact.)
The stipulative approach, in contrast to the realist approach, allows for the
adoption of the position of fictional explicitism, wherein “the set of propositions
that are true in a given fiction is a subset of the set of propositions that are ex-
pressed by explicit statements in the corresponding works” [D’Alessandro, 2016,
53]. It is important, however, to make clear the causal direction here. When
Voltolini, articulating a creationist or stipulative account of fiction, says that
statements of fiction “are true with respect to a make-believe world, namely
a world in which things go precisely the way in which the relevant story-teller
8
pretends that they are” [Voltolini, 2011, 112] this makes it look as if the exis-
tence of the possible world “in which things go precisely” a particular way is
what makes the sentences true. However, it is in fact the other way around: It
is because the statement is taken as true that there is a make-believe world in
which things go in the relevant way.
The view that fanfic—and fandom more generally—is derivative or depen-
dent, corresponds nicely with a Lewisian realist view of possible worlds. If, as
Routley claims, “[a] work of fiction is regarded as portraying part of a world”
[Routley, 1979, 3], cf. also [6]), though these worlds “are usually incomplete”
[8], then fanfic depends on its canon in virtue of it explicating the same possible
world (or worlds) as the canonical story. As Gwenllian-Jones says, “fictional
worlds, of necessity, always exceed the texts that describe them. . . The recovery
of the fictional world from its fragmented and partial textual presence is a dy-
namic cognitive process in which textual data, knowledge of the real world, and
imagination are all marshalled” [Gwenllian-Jones, 2004, 92]. Lewis’s possible
worlds are really out there, and when we are writing, drawing, or creating a
film, we are merely describing or depicting these worlds. Lewis himself even dis-
cusses the phenomenon of fanfiction (without, however, calling it by this term).
He notes that “many other authors [other than Conan Doyle] also have written
Holmes stories. These would have little point without interfictional carry-over.
Surely many things are true in these satellite stories not because of the ex-
plicit content of the satellite story itself, and not because they are part of the
background, but rather because they carry over from Conan Doyle’s original
Holmes stories” [Lewis, 1978, 45]. This same ‘interfictional carry-over’ occurs
when readers import knowledge of certain types of tropes into a story where
those tropes are not explicitly mentioned. For example, Lewis cites the case
of Scrulch, who has all the properties generally associated with dragons, even
though it is not explicitly stated that Scrulch can breathe fire (and neither is it
explicitly stated that he can’t). Lewis argues that due to interfictional carry-
over we conclude that Scrulch can breath fire [Lewis, 1978, 45]. (There is much
that could be said here both about literary tropes and default reasoning, but
we do not have the space to take up this topic here).
One might even say that this description of the fictional world happens in a
way similar to the way in which historians and artists describe and depict real
events. Such an account would also explain the feeling that one may have, in the
presence of extremely well-crafted fictions, that the original author is doing more
than merely making things up, that he is telling you things that really exist,
and are really out there, and are so independently of whether he ever told you
them. This feeling can be enhanced when one part of a series of books set in the
same world are written by one author and another part by another, as happened
with the Wheel of Time series begun by Robert Jordan and finished by Brandon
Sanderson. Sanderson’s writing style is enough different from Jordan’s that one
has the feeling that one was reading a history where the chronicler changed
part-way through. This sense of “different writer, same story” enhanced the
feeling that the story was more than just something created in the head of
the author, for if it had been, then it is unclear to what extent someone else
could’ve had sufficient access to that mental content to continue on with the
story, if the mental content only existed in the mind of the original author. It is
an advantage of this view that it allows the creation of derivative or dependent
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works, for it gives us one way of understanding what happens in the creation
or production of fanfic: There is some real world or story out there, and many
people have access to it and have the ability to tell different parts of the story or
describe (including, e.g., paint/draw) different parts of the world. This account
can also ground statements of error in representation, such as complaints against
the representation in a particular movie of certain characters from literature by,
e.g., the wrong choice of actor. Such claims rely on there being an actual fact
of the matter.
But despite the many ways in which modal realism seems to get fanfiction
right, the Lewisian view also seems to get some aspects of the practice and
production of fanfiction wrong, of which we will highlight three.
The first is the problem of underdetermination, i.e., the fact that there
are some aspects of stories or fictional worlds concerning which there appears
to in fact be no fact of the matter, and that no amount of inspection of the
fictional world would ever answer certain questions one way or another. For
example when [Sprague de Camp, 1976] asks, “Why did the Middle-Earthians
have no formal religion?” [45], it is unclear what aspects about the fictional world
itself, as opposed to aspects about Tolkien as its author, that could answer this
question.
The second is that the very production of fanfic is problematic for a (wholly)
dependent or derivative account, because—as noted above—not all fanfic is
considered equal. Most fanfic remains outside of the canon; but in the cases
where it becomes part of the fanon or even the canon, it does not do so because
readers have viewed the original fictional world through a telescope and found
the fanfic to describe it correctly. Instead, it seems that fanfic becomes canon
precisely because it becomes constitutive of the fiction. It constitutes a new part
or portion of the story or world that did not exist before, and it does so in a
specific way, going beyond being merely consistent with the activities (or even
the character’s intentions, mental states, or character) of the story-so-far. A
Lewisian view cannot account for this understanding of how fanfic can become
canon.
The third is that it is not always clear how to extend the dependency view
of fanfic to other, related, fandom phenomena, such as conlangs (constructed
languages, usually developed in fictional contexts). With the rise of epic science
fiction and fantasy TV series in the last few decades, there has been increasing
attention to the question of foreign and alien languages, with the result that
there are out there linguists whose profession it is to develop languages for these
TV series and associated movies. When one looks at how these conlangs are
designed, constructed, and implemented, it is hard to give a dependent rather
than constitutive account of these languages. It is difficult to speak of anything
other than “creating” the languages; they are created and not “discovered” or
“recovered” from some actual extant grammar, vocabulary, phonetics, script,
as would be required on a dependent view. Instead, these languages did not
exist before they were created; and, very interestingly, after they are created
they can even become constitutive of the fictions themselves in a very concrete
way. A clear example of this can be seen in the Dothraki language developed
by [Peterson, 2015] for the “Game of Thrones” TV series. The language as it
originally appeared in the books was ad hoc, as Martin had no systematization
behind his original uses of Dothraki words and phrases. After Peterson was
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hired to extend and expand the fragment into a robust language with a concrete
‘history’, Martin now incorporates Peterson’s version of the language into the
books in a systematized and meaningful fashion. It is difficult to see how this
could be given a dependent rather than constitutive explanation
Faced with a choice between Lewisian modal realism and Kripkean stip-
ulativism, the Kripkean view seems better equipped to account for the fan-
fic/fanon/canon distinctions than a Lewisian view. The three objections that
we raised against a Lewisian understanding are none of them applicable to a
Kripkean view.
To the objection of underdetermination, the Kripkean can reply by simply
stipulating that the world is thus-and-so rather than that-and-such. Something
not yet determined? No problem! Simply stipulate further how you want the
world to be!
To the difficulty the Lewisian account has explaining how fanfic can become
canon, the Kripkean view, where fictional worlds are defined by stipulation,
can account for the move of fanfic from ‘not-canon’ to ‘canon’ because of the
constitutive nature of canon-creation.
Finally, to the problem of the associated business of world-building, including
the construction of conlangs, the Kripkean’s response is almost self-evident:
Because the possible worlds are the result of a stipulative and constructive act,
it is straightforward to integrate the construction of languages, etc., into the
conceptual framework of the rest of the fanfic-creation process.
On these three counts, then, the Kripkean approach seems a clear winner;
and if this is correct, then we must also favor the constructive account of fanfic
over the dependent account. Unfortunately, it would be too quick to conclude
this, for the Kripkean approach has its own problems. First of all, there is a way
in which the liberality of the Kripkean account is too liberal: The only constraint
on the stipulation of Kripkean possible worlds is the law of non-contradiction
(and even this can be rejected if one admits impossible worlds [Berto, 2013]).
But there are—user-implemented—constraints in the production of fanfic. As
we discussed above, not every story that is consistent with the original story
is eligible to become canon; but a Kripkean account of will not give us any
insight as to what is eligible and what is not because the production of canon
is essentially a social process, not a metaphysical one.
We also discussed above how producers of fanfiction do not have free choice,
but are instead constrained, more or less, by the authority of canon. It is also
difficult to explain Cook’s five features of canon from a Kripkean account of the
production of fanfiction9, something that we may yet wish to require from our
philosophical theories of fiction.
4 Conclusion
What we hope to have shown in this paper is that fandom is full of philo-
sophically interesting material—including fanfiction—much of which is under-
investigated. We focused on but one area of fandom, introducing the notions
of “fanfiction”, “canon”, “fanon”, etc., and argued that any adequate philo-
sophical account of fiction must be able to explain these. As a test case, we
9This is also a problem for the Lewisian account, too.
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considered two variants of the possible-worlds account of fiction, the Lewisian
realist and the Kripkean stipulative, and showed that they parallel the two
ways in which fanfiction can be understood, as either dependent/derivative or
constructive/constitutive.
Whether fanfic is best understood as derivative or constitutive is itself not
a mere philosophical question, but potentially has legal implications:
Bruce Keller and Rebecca Tushnet point out that no “bright-line
rule” states that only parody, among all genres of transformation,
may be monetized under the banner of fair use. Keller and Tushnet
argue that the Supreme Court based its “vision of transformative
fair use” on Judge Pierre Laval’s concept of “productive” use that
“employ[s] the quoted matter in a different manner or for a differ-
ent purpose from the original.”. . . A strong case may be made that,
by Laval’s definition, fan fiction qualifies as ‘productive’ reworking
of original material that does not threaten the marketability of its
source works. . .
If a case involving fan fiction and copyright infringement ever re-
sults in a court ruling, that ruling may agree with this framing of
fan fiction as productive and non-threatening (or even promotional)
rather than derivative and competitive [de Kosnick, 2009, 122].
This shows the importance of providing a thorough-going foundation for what-
ever account of fanfic we ultimately settle on. We have argued that neither the
Lewisian or the Kripkean approach gives a thoroughly satisfying account of fan-
fiction, with both failing to accurately capture certain aspects of the practice. It
is difficult to explain how Cook’s five observations about the canon/fanon/non-
canon divide could be true if the underlying structure of fictional truth is
Lewisian, while on the other hand, a Kripkean account must be restricted so
that complete free choice is circumscribed.
As it stands, neither account is able to effectively underpin the actual prac-
tice of fanfiction, and it is clear that an adequate theory will have to be much
more nuanced than some standard philosophical theories of fiction generally
are. Nevertheless, we have demonstrated that the Kripkean account does fare
better than the Lewisian account, with the stipulative or constructive approach
going further towards providing a foundation for understanding the relevant
phenomenon. There is plenty of fodder for future work in developing this. In
particular, one might think that a possible-worlds approach to truth-in-fiction
is simply too narrow to be able to account for all of the myriad facets of prac-
tice and production that go into fanfiction. Further work might be well-served
by being devoted to taking a more general approach; indeed, it has been sug-
gested10 that there may be interesting parallels between fanfiction and musical
improvisation and the making of cover versions of songs, a suggestion which we
hope to pursue in future work.
We also believe there is benefit in widening the scope of analysis to include a
number of features specifically excluded in this paper. Such topics ripe for philo-
sophical investigation include the relationship between LARPing and fanfiction;
the contexts in which certain types of cosplay can be understood in a counterfac-
tual manner; how literary canons can extend their authority to different media
10By Joe Morrison, Belfast, during post-colloquium discussion after I presented this paper.
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such as music, art, and film; as well as more typical philosophical questions such
as how different characters can be identified across different fictional contexts
as “the same character”, via notions of intentional identity [Sandgren, 2016] or
via stipulation [Routley, 1979, 3]; the metaphysics of the metaverse; and the
problem of understanding how cross-over fictions, which “take the characters
from one fictional world and ‘cross’ them with another” [Thomas, 2011, 8], op-
erate. All of these questions have been spectacularly ignored by contemporary
philosophy, which, we believe, has much of interest to say, both to philosophers
and to fans.
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